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Blinding prosecutors 
to defendants’ race: A 
policy proposal to reduce 
unconscious bias in the 
criminal justice system
Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson, & Shima B. Baughman
abstract4
Racial minorities are disproportionately imprisoned in the United States. 
This disparity is unlikely to be due solely to differences in criminal behavior. 
Behavioral science research has documented that prosecutors harbor 
unconscious racial biases. These unconscious biases play a role whenever 
prosecutors exercise their broad discretion, such as in choosing what 
crimes to charge and when negotiating plea bargains. To reduce this risk of 
unconscious racial bias, we propose a policy change: Prosecutors should 
be blinded to the race of criminal defendants wherever feasible. This could 
be accomplished by removing information identifying or suggesting the 
defendant’s race from police dossiers shared with prosecutors and by 
avoiding mentions of race in conversations between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys. Race is almost always irrelevant to the merits of a 
criminal prosecution; it should be omitted from the proceedings whenever 
possible for the sake of justice.
Sah, S., Robertson, C. T., & Baughman, S. B. (2015). Blinding prosecutors to defendants’ 
race: A policy proposal to reduce unconscious bias in the criminal justice system. Behav-
ioral Science & Policy, 1(2), pp. 83–91.
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P
rosecutors may have more independent 
power and discretion than any other 
government officials in the United States.1 
Prosecutors decide whether to initiate crim-
inal proceedings, what charges to file or bring 
before a grand jury, how and when to prose-
cute individuals, and what penalties to seek. For 
a given criminal behavior, half a dozen charges 
might apply, ranging from minor misdemeanors 
to the most serious felonies. A prosecutor can 
decline to press charges altogether or stack 
charges by characterizing the same behavior as 
violating the law dozens of times (charging each 
phone call made as part of a drug transaction 
as a crime, for instance). Once charged, about 
95% of criminal cases are resolved through plea 
bargaining, where prosecutors can defer pros-
ecution, suspend a sentence, minimize factual 
allegations in ways that virtually guarantee a light 
sentence, or insist on the most severe penal-
ties.2 If a case does go to trial, a prosecutor’s 
sentencing demand provides an influential refer-
ence point (an anchor) for a defense attorney’s 
response in plea negotiations and the judge’s 
final sentencing decision.3
Prosecutors typically do not need to articulate 
the bases for their discretionary decisions,4,5 and 
these decisions receive only minimal scrutiny 
from the courts. Although the U.S. Constitution 
theoretically limits the discretion of prosecu-
tors (to target a particular race prejudicially, for 
instance), such protections are exceedingly 
difficult to invoke,6 especially if a prosecu-
tor’s unconscious rather than intentional bias 
is in play.7 This context prompts us to offer an 
important and novel proposal with the potential 
to help make the justice system blind to race.
Prosecutors, we believe, should be unaware 
of  defendants’ race whenever possible. Imple-
menting such  a significant change would be 
challenging, clearly. But evidence of persistent 
disparities regarding the proportion of racial 
minorities that are put in prison makes the need 
for change apparent. And growing evidence that 
prosecutors’ unconscious biases contribute to 
that imbalance gives us a potentially powerful 
target for efforts to produce positive and vitally 
needed change.
Racial Bias in the Criminal 
Justice System
In 2010 in the United States, Blacks made up 
38% of all prisoners, although they made up 
only 12% of the national population.8 That 
same year, about one in 23 Black men was in 
prison, compared with one in 147 White men.9 
The causes of this racial disparity are many and 
complex. Socioeconomic factors (poverty and 
lower educational achievement, for example) 
play a role. So may inequitable police behavior 
that, for example, leads to Blacks being stopped 
and frisked more often than Whites are.10,11
Black defendants also tend to receive harsher 
sentences than White defendants do, even 
when both the severity of the crime and previous 
criminal history are taken into account.12 For 
example, harsher punishment was applied to 
crimes related to crack cocaine versus powder 
cocaine in federal sentencing guidelines, which 
tended to punish Blacks more harshly because 
they were more likely to be arrested with crack 
cocaine than powder cocaine. To minimize this 
disparate impact on Blacks, Congress passed the 
Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, which reduced the 
unequal penalties and eliminated the five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for simple crack 
cocaine possession. This new law addressed the 
racial bias perpetrated by the old regime that led 
to low-level crack dealers, who were often Black, 
receiving more severe sentences than wholesale 
suppliers of powdered cocaine.13
One important cause of the racial discrep-
ancy among prisoners, however, is bias that 
affects discretionary decisions made by prose-
cutors.14–17 A recent review of empirical studies 
examining prosecutorial decision making and 
race found that most of the studies suggested 
that the defendants’ “race directly or indirectly 
influenced case outcomes, even when a host of 
other legal or extra-legal factors are taken into 
account.”17 Minorities, particularly Black males, 
“receive disproportionately harsher treatment at 
each stage of the prosecutorial decision-making 
process.”18 Indeed, prosecutors in predominantly 
Black communities have been shown to make 
racially biased decisions, such as overcharging 
Black youth,19 which, in turn, perpetuates racial 
w
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stereotypes.20,21 Further, Black children in the 
United States are much more likely than White 
children to be sentenced as adults,22 probably 
because Black juveniles are perceived to be 
older and less childlike than White juveniles.23,24
These data do not suggest that prosecutors are 
overtly racist, although some may be. Instead, 
research documents that bias can infect even 
people with the best of intentions, including 
physicians and other professionals.25,26 Prose-
cutors are humans with bounded rationality, 
making decisions in a cultural milieu that shapes 
their perceptions and decisions on an uncon-
scious level.15,27,28 Generally, bias increases in 
ambiguous situations,20,29–33 and as we described 
previously, decisions on what and how many 
charges to file against a defendant are inherently 
ambiguous.
Behavioral science researchers have demon-
strated that people unknowingly misremember 
case facts in racially biased ways.34,35 For 
example, there is a greater tendency to 
remember aggressive actions (e.g., punches or 
kicks) if a suspect is Black.34 In fact, it appears 
that the more stereotypically Black a defendant 
is perceived to be, the more likely that person is 
to be sentenced to death.36 In one study, Stan-
ford University students viewed photographs of 
Black men, rating each one on the degree to 
which the person’s appearance was stereotyp-
ically Black. The students were told they could 
base their decisions on any of the features of 
the photographed subjects to make their deci-
sions, including noses, lips, skin tone, and hair. 
Unbeknownst to the students, each man in 
the images had been convicted of murdering 
a White person. The men the students rated as 
appearing more stereotypically Black were more 
likely to have been sentenced to death in criminal 
proceedings.36 Other research has demonstrated 
that lighter skin tones may lead to more lenient 
judgments and prison sentences.20,37
Although bias exists throughout the criminal 
justice system, bias in prosecutorial decisions 
has a potentially disproportionate impact, given 
that most criminal cases do not go to trial and 
prosecutors exercise such wide discretion in 
handling them. One might hope that selecting 
prosecutors of good faith and asking them to 
behave professionally could avert racial bias. In 
this vein, in 2014, the Department of Justice reaf-
firmed its policy that “in making decisions . . . law 
enforcement officers may not use race.”38 Such a 
policy, although laudable, unfortunately cannot 
prevent unconscious bias.
Prosecutorial decisions are made in a more 
deliberative fashion than, for example, split-
second decisions made by police to shoot 
or not shoot. However, even with delibera-
tive decisions, the ability to self-regulate bias is 
difficult: Moral reasoning is usually a post hoc 
construction, generated after a (usually intuitive) 
judgment has been reached,39 often influenced 
by erroneous factors.40 People exhibiting bias are 
typically unaware that they are doing so, and bias 
is often unintentional.33,41,42 Educating people 
on unconscious bias often leads them to be 
convinced that other people are biased but that 
they themselves are not.29 Accordingly, strategies 
to encourage people to become less biased are 
usually not sufficient.
One program that had some success in reducing 
racial disparities was the 2006 Prosecution and 
Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute of 
Justice. Prosecutors collected and published 
data on defendant and victim race for each 
offense category and the prosecutorial action 
taken at each stage of criminal proceedings.43 
These data exposed that similarly situated defen-
dants of different races were treated differently 
at each stage of discretion: initial case screening, 
charging, plea offers, and final disposition. For 
instance, in Wisconsin, the data showed that 
prosecutors were charging Black defendants 
at higher rates than White defendants for drug 
possession. With this information, the district 
attorney made an office policy to refer suspects 
to drug treatment rather than charging them 
in an attempt to reduce racial bias in charging. 
However, this approach requires a large 
“bias affects discretionary 
decisions made by 
prosecutors”
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investment from overburdened prosecutorial 
offices to collect and analyze their data to reveal 
trends in racial disparity. It also requires that indi-
vidual prosecutors be motivated to consciously 
avoid bias or at least be motivated to appear 
unbiased.44,45 This motivation is often led by soci-
etal norms or public pressure regarding racial 
attitudes and inequality, which varies by jurisdic-
tion. There presently is no complete solution to 
eliminate racial bias in prosecutorial decisions.
Blinding: An Alternative 
Approach to Managing Bias
An alternative way to manage bias is to acknowl-
edge its existence and create institutional 
procedures to prevent bias from influencing 
important decisions. The psychologist Robert 
Rosenthal, a leading methodologist, concluded 
that the best way to reduce the chances of bias 
unconsciously affecting decision processes is to 
keep the process “as blind as possible for as long 
as possible.”46
Blinding (or masking) to improve decision-
making has a long history in different domains. 
For example, having musicians audition behind 
a screen decreased gender bias and increased 
the acceptance rate of women into symphony 
orchestras.47 In medical science, both subjects 
and researchers are, whenever feasible, kept 
unaware of who is in the treatment or control 
groups of clinical trials, in an effort to achieve 
unbiased results.48 Meta-analyses have shown 
that such blinding reduces the number of false 
positives in science experiments.49,50 Similarly, 
editors of scholarly journals routinely remove 
authors’ names and institutions from submis-
sions so they can assess articles on their scientific 
merits alone.51 Likewise, to avoid possible favor-
itism, some professors mask students’ identities 
on papers when grading.52
Blinding is already in use in other stages of the 
criminal justice process. For example, lineups are 
widely acknowledged to be best conducted by 
an officer who does not know which person is 
the suspect, so as not to pollute the eyewitness’s 
perceptions.53,54 This practice of blind administra-
tion of lineups was originally highly controversial. 
Iowa State University professor Gary Wells first 
proposed implementing blinding of police to 
suspect lineups in 1988,55 although evidence 
of bias and erroneous identification had been 
accumulating for years before that. More than 
a decade later, in 1999, the U.S. Department 
of Justice published a set of best practices for 
conducting police lineups56 that excluded blind 
procedures (although it acknowledged that 
having investigators who did not know which 
person in the lineup was the suspect was desir-
able) because blinding “may be impractical for 
some jurisdictions to implement” (p. 9).56 Never-
theless, individual jurisdictions experimented 
with blind procedures.57 By 2014, the National 
Research Council recommended unreservedly 
that all lineups should be conducted with the 
benefits of blinding.58
Blinding has also been recommended for 
forensic scientists and other expert witnesses, 
so that attorneys for either side in a case do not 
influence and undermine their scientific exper-
tise.32 More generally, the rules of evidence 
(which determine what is permissible in court) 
can be understood as an elaborate blinding 
procedure, designed to ensure that juries are 
not exposed to irrelevant or unreliable evidence, 
recognizing that for the purpose of assessing 
guilt, some factors are more prejudicial than 
probative.59
The Case for Blinded 
Prosecutors
The success of the long-standing practice of 
blinding in other contexts gives credence to our 
proposal that prosecutors should be blinded 
to the race of criminal defendants whenever 
possible. Prosecutors, like other professionals, 
cannot be biased by what they do not know. 
In addition to mitigating unconscious bias, 
the blinding of prosecutors also mitigates any 
“prosecutors should be blinded to the race 
of criminal defendants whenever possible”
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conscious racism, which may infect some 
prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors already use a race-blinding 
procedure for death penalty decisions. The 
Department of Justice requires that attorneys 
on committees of capital cases (which deter-
mine death eligibility) review each defendant file 
only after information related to the race of the 
defendant has been removed.60 Only paralegal 
assistants who collect statistics know the defen-
dants’ races. The question is how far this practice 
can and should be expanded. We believe there 
is potential for broader use of race blinding by 
other prosecutors. Prosecutors are a good target 
for race blinding given their substantial power 
and impact, particularly with two pivotal deci-
sions: the filing of charges and the negotiation 
of plea bargains.
Charging Decisions
Prosecutorial practice varies in different juris-
dictions. For petty offenses, a prosecutor may 
make key decisions in court while facing defen-
dants, making blinding infeasible (unless that 
dynamic itself is reformed). In many jurisdictions, 
however, prosecutors do not see defendants in 
person when making initial charging decisions; 
these are based on information provided in 
police dossiers, in which race could be redacted. 
In fact, the trend is for such information to be 
conveyed to prosecutors electronically, making 
it easier to filter the race information, perhaps 
automatically by electronic tools or by interme-
diaries. In either case, race information could be 
retained for other uses such as identification or 
demographic tracking. As the Department of 
Justice capital-case review committees show, 
some assistants can have access to a full crim-
inal file while decisionmakers see only race-blind 
information.
Plea Bargaining
Although defendants retain the ultimate choice 
about whether to accept any deal, the prose-
cuting and defense attorneys actually negotiate 
that deal, and the prosecutor need not be 
exposed to the race of the defendant. In some 
jurisdictions, plea bargaining happens at arraign-
ments with defendants in the same room. But 
this practice is neither uniform nor necessary. 
Thus, the two steps that are conclusive for the 
vast majority of cases—charging decisions and 
plea bargaining—can potentially be blinded to 
race.
Limitations, Challenges, and 
the Need for Pilot Testing
Although we argue for the value of race blinding 
procedures, we acknowledge that there will be 
difficulties and limitations in implementing such 
a policy. Race should have no legitimate role in 
the vast majority of charging decisions. However, 
in rare situations, such as prosecutions for hate 
crime, the race of an alleged perpetrator is rele-
vant. In these cases, the necessary information 
can be provided to prosecutors.
For cases in which race is irrelevant, the blinding 
strategy will be effective at eliminating bias only 
to the extent that prosecutors are unable to infer 
race from other information available to them. 
Thus, it will be necessary to remove informa-
tion that could reveal race, such as photos of 
a defendant; the defendant’s name;61 and, in 
racially segregated communities, the defen-
dant’s address. The practicalities of removing 
all race-related information could become 
complex. Further, race blinding may not be 
feasible if photos contain relevant information 
(such as defensive wounds on the defendant’s 
skin) or eyewitness testimony describes a perpe-
trator’s race.
To prevent prosecutors from inferring race 
from the defendants’ names, court documents 
could instead identify defendants with assigned 
numbers (such as driver’s license numbers). 
That said, removing names may have other 
unintended effects, such as reducing empathy, 
leading to harsher decisions toward anonymous 
defendants.62 An alternative approach would be 
the use of random race-neutral pseudonyms to 
achieve anonymity without erasing all trace that 
a person is involved.
The severity of punishment is a question for the 
legislature. If race blinding succeeds, it levels the 
playing field for all by promoting equality, even if 
it decreases bias favorable to White defendants 
(often referred to as White privilege).63–65 Both 
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unjustified leniency for Whites and unjustified 
harsher punishments for Blacks were revealed 
in 2015 by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil 
Rights Division’s investigation of the Ferguson 
(Missouri) Police Department. Of the many 
examples discussed in the report, one clearly 
highlighted the double standards: Whites were 
more likely to have citations, fines, and fees 
eliminated by city officials, whereas Blacks were 
punished for the same minor transgressions with 
expensive tickets and judgments punishing their 
perceived lack of personal responsibility (pp. 
74–75).66 That said, in other contexts, punish-
ments may be harsher for Whites than for 
Blacks.17 Blinding may create racial equity for 
both Black and White defendants.
Given that race blinding may not be feasible 
in some situations, may fail, or may have unin-
tended consequences, the best path forward is 
to pilot-test this intervention and gauge its effec-
tiveness. Pilot testing would allow researchers to 
uncover (and perhaps creatively address) chal-
lenges in the practical implementation of race 
blinding; evaluate on a smaller scale the precise 
impact, success, and value of race blinding; 
and expose any potential unintended conse-
quences.33,67–69 Sequential rollouts in different 
jurisdictions are also valuable, as they allow for 
continued monitoring and assessment in varying 
contexts.
In theory, prosecutors could be blinded to other 
information that may activate biases, including 
the race of the victim or the gender of the 
defendant or victim. These reforms should 
be considered on their own merits, including 
whether empirical evidence demonstrates that 
these variables are biasing prosecutorial deci-
sions in a systematic fashion that is irrelevant to 
the proper application of the law. These consid-
erations would also apply to whether blinding 
could be expanded to other decision-makers, 
including defense attorneys, judges, juries, and 
parole boards.
Impact and Cost Effectiveness
The need to eliminate race bias in prosecution 
is urgent. Racial biases can substantially distort 
decisions,61,70 and prosecutorial bias alone 
leads to a substantial increase in the duration 
and severity of punishment for minorities. A 
study using 222,542 cases in New York County 
during 2010–2011 found that Black defendants 
were 10% more likely to be detained pretrial 
compared with White defendants charged with 
similar crimes, and they were 13% more likely to 
receive offers of prison sentences during plea 
bargaining.71 Given that a prosecutor typically 
handles dozens of felonies and over a hundred 
misdemeanors per year,72 the impact of racial 
bias is compounded. Approximately 27,000 state 
prosecutors deal with 2.9 million felony cases 
per year, and 6,075 federal prosecutors secure 
82,000 convictions per year, not to mention 
the millions of prosecutorial decisions that are 
made on misdemeanor charges.73,74 Two-thirds 
of those convicted of a felony go to prison, and 
the average sentence is about five years,75 at a 
cost of $25,000 per prisoner per year.76 There-
fore, given that prosecutors are responsible for 
hundreds of person-years of incarceration annu-
ally and thus millions of dollars of public money, 
even a marginal reduction in bias may have a 
substantial effect.
These numbers have an impact that extends 
beyond the direct experiences of people 
sentenced to do time. As The Pew Charitable 
Trusts reported in 2010, the income of house-
holds and the educational success of children in 
those households decline when parents are put 
in jail.77 The tangible and intangible costs to the 
prisoners, their families, and the broader society 
are tremendous.
Successfully blinding prosecutors to defendants’ 
race may also improve the perceived legitimacy 
of prosecutorial decisions, which may enhance 
compliance with the law.78 As important as 
anything else, it would advance some of the 
fundamental goals of our government: the equal 
treatment of all citizens and justice for all.
“Race disparities pervade 
criminal justice decision-
making in America”
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A New Standard: Blinding 
Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race
If race blinding proves to be effective after pilot 
testing, we recommend that local and state 
prosecutors and the federal Department of 
Justice adopt race blinding as a uniform prac-
tice. We recommend that national and statewide 
associations of prosecutors (for example, the 
National District Attorneys Association), as well 
as broader organizations such as the American 
Bar Association (ABA), support implementation 
of the reforms. Furthermore, we recommend 
that this imperative be written into ethical codes 
and guidelines, such as the U.S. Attorneys’ Hand-
book Chapter 9-27.000 (USAM) and Rule 3.8 of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(1983). Our reform also relies on the ethical 
behavior of attorneys, police, and other inter-
mediaries who would not leak the race of the 
defendant to prosecutors. Adoption of this norm 
into the current ethical code could build on the 
current norms of confidentiality.
Race disparities pervade criminal justice deci-
sionmaking in America. Among criminal-justice 
actors, the decisions of prosecutors are the least 
reviewable, are exercised with the most discre-
tion, and are impactful. Blinding has been used 
as a tool to reduce gender and race discrimi-
nation in many fields, and its value is grounded 
in empirical evidence. We believe that blinding 
prosecutors to a defendant’s race wherever 
feasible is a timely and important proposal.
We acknowledge that there will be practical 
implementation challenges and risks. Our 
primary aim with this proposal is to instigate 
a discussion on the merits and drawbacks of 
blinding prosecutors to race and to encourage 
pilot tests. The Department of Justice demon-
strated the feasibility of race blinding for federal 
prosecutors60 and state prosecutors could follow 
suit with similar procedures for their own death 
penalty cases. Expanding race blinding to other 
prosecutorial decisions may seem impractical; 
but, if the history of blind police lineups is any 
guide,55 the jurisdictions most committed to 
racial equality and behaviorally informed policy-
making will prove otherwise.
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